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Lone-Actor Terrorist Target Choice 
 
Abstract 
Lone-actor terrorist attacks have risen to the forefront of the public’s consciousness in 
the past few years. Some of these attacks were conducted against public officials. The 
rise of hard-to-detect, low-tech attacks may lead to more public officials being 
targeted. This paper explores whether different behavioral traits are apparent within a 
sample of lone-actor terrorists who plotted against high-value targets (including 
public officials) than within a sample of lone-actors that plotted against members of 
the public. Utilizing a unique dataset of 111 lone-actor terrorists, we test a series of 
hypotheses related to attack capability and operational security. The results indicate 
that very little differentiates those who attack high-value targets from those who 
attack members of the public. We conclude with a series of illustrations to theorise 
why this may be the case.   
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Introduction 
 
Once they have decided to commit an attack, the lone-actor terrorist acts under a 
number of social, technical, financial, and practical constraints. Often, this requires 
abandoning an ambitious plan for something less complicated. These hurdles may 
reflect why terrorism has typically been largely a group-based phenomenon. The 
pooling of talent, resources, expertise and experience in a group setting likely helps 
mitigate the difficulties in successfully committing a terrorist attack. However, some 
lone-actor terrorists do manage to conduct successful attacks against high-value 
targets, including public officials. For example, in October 2014, Michael Zehaf-
Bibeau fatally shot a Canadian soldier on sentry duty at the Canadian National War 
Memorial in Ottawa. Zehaf-Bibeau then entered the parliament building through the 
main entrance. A constable noticed Zehaf-Bibeau’s rifle and attempted to wrest it 
from him. Zehaf-Bibeau shot and wounded the constable. Chased by Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police  officers, Zehaf-Bibeau ran towards the Library of Parliament, 
passing various committee rooms containing Members of Parliament, 
 including the then Canadian Prime Minister, as well as the leader of the opposition. A 
shoot-out followed and Zehaf-Bibeau was killed. The attack illustrated the growing 
threat of ISIS-inspired lone-actors seeking to commit attacks against high-value 
targets.  
 
Despite its remaining a low-base rate phenomenon, there has been a considerable 
amount of research on various aspects of lone-actor terrorism. A primary research 
endeavour has involved exploring the psychology and ideological motivations that 
underpin lone-actor terrorism. This has included specific analyses of the role of online 
radicalisation in motivational development and ideological change (Berntzen & 
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Sandberg, 2014; Borum, 2013; COT, 2007; Gardell, 2014; Gill & Corner, 2015; 
Corner, Gill & Mason, 2016; Michael, 2012; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011; Peddell 
et al, 2016; Spaaij, 2012; Springer, 2009; Weinmann, 2012). Other studies highlight 
the specific difficulties that lone actors pose to contemporary counter-terrorism 
practices (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Brynielsson et al., 2013; Carter & 
Carter, 2012; Coffey, 2011; Hewitt, 2014; Meyer, 2013; Striegher, 2013). Yet others 
have utilized a range of datasets to outline the profile, or lack thereof, of lone actors 
accompanied by an analysis of pre-attack behaviours (COT, 2007; Eby, 2012; Gill et 
al., 2014; Gill, 2015a; Gruenewald et al., 2013; Jasparro, 2010; Meloy & Gill, 2016; 
Spaaij, 2010; Teich, 2011). Finally, comparative analyses with analogous offender 
types have highlighted similarities and differences between lone actors and school 
shooters, mass murderers and group terrorists (Gill & Corner, 2013; Gruenewald et 
al., 2013; Malkki, 2014; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014; McCauley et al., 2013). 
 
This paper explores whether lone-actor terrorists who target high-value targets differ 
from those who purely attack members of the public. Are they better-trained, more 
flexible criminals, more operationally secure, less impulsive, and more heavily 
embedded within potentially rich sources of social support? Within the literature on 
lone-actor terrorism, the specific subjects of attack preparation and planning, and of 
attack commission, have received little attention. This paper undertakes a statistical 
analysis utilizing a unique sample of 111 lone-actor terrorists in order to answer these 
questions.  
Lone Actor Terrorist Attack Research 
There is not yet a distinct theme within the literature on lone actor terrorism that 
focuses specifically on attack preparation, though one would expect that increasing 
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our understanding of what happens pre-attack will significantly strengthen 
preventative efforts (Appleton, 2014, p.136). Gill et al. (2014) found that lone actor 
attacks are "rarely sudden and impulsive" (p. 434), although anecdotal evidence of 
recent ISIS-inspired attacks suggests this may be changing. All studies agree that 
preparatory conduct is typical, though the degree to which individuals engage in it 
varies (Spaaij, 2010; 2012). Existing research is also generally in agreement that a 
low level of sophistication characterizes the weapons and methods used in lone-actor 
attacks (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010; Jasparro, 2010; Barnes, 2012; Ackerman & 
Pinson, 2014; Appleton, 2014).  
The literature is also generally in agreement that the weapons most frequently used by 
lone actors are firearms, followed by bombs (COT, 2007; Gruenewald et al., 2013a; 
2013; Jasparro, 2010; Spaaij, 2010; 2012; van der Heide, 2011). Some studies 
hypothesise that little training or expertise is required to use firearms, which can be 
easily acquired in certain countries (Jasparro, 2010; van der Heide, 2011). 
Constructing a successful explosive device is considerably more difficult, and lone 
actors seem less likely to have the requisite knowledge and expertise (Ackerman & 
Pinson, 2014; Kenney; 2010). With regards to preference for firearms versus 
explosive devises, and to weapons choice more generally, it appears that there may be 
differences between lone- and group actors (Spaaij, 2012). Jasparro (2010), observing 
a further preference for vehicle-collision based attacks, suggests that lone actors, 
overall, make relatively more use of low-skilled, 'pragmatic' weaponry. Of course, 
weapon selection is not independent from target choice, as specific target 
characteristics will render the use of certain weapons more or less appropriate (Clarke 
& Newman, 2006). With regards to target choice, people are the most commonly 
selected target, with the general public much more likely to be attacked than 
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government officials or politicians, who are more likely to receive personal protection 
or work in protected environments (COT, 2007; Eby, 2012; Spaaij, 2010; 2012; van 
der Heide, 2011; Teich, 2013).  
On aggregate, these findings present a picture of an attack preparation phase that is, in 
many cases, characterized by a low level of sophistication (relative to, for example, 
group-based terrorist incidents) and driven by a variety of ideological motives. 
However, what this accumulated research does not provide is an abundance of 
concrete details about the modi operandi of lone actors. One reason for this is that 
such data has, so far, not been captured in detail by quantitative analyses (COT, 
2007). Another factor is the variety of attack styles that lone actors have displayed, 
the above observations aside; although most have used firearms, others have opted for 
explosives, while others still have adopted more unusual means, such as using cars to 
run over their victims (Eby, 2012). As Bakker and De Graaf (2010) have argued, lone 
actor attacks are characterized by a "wide variety in target selection, use of weapons 
and modus operandi" (p. 4). 
Predicting Target Choice 
The targets of terrorist attacks differ in terms of how exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, 
destructible, occupied, near (to the offender), and easy they are (Newman and Clark, 
2010). We might therefore expect those who target high-value targets (government, 
military etc.) to differ significantly in terms of their capabilities from those who target 
members of the public. Attacks on high-value targets, all things being equal, should 
be a more complex task. High-value targets such as military personnel, military 
infrastructure, police or politicians are more target-hardened than most areas 
frequented by the general public. Capacity to undertake  an attack may draw upon a 
range of resources including individual skills, operational security, the offender’s 
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immediate life-experiences, network properties and behaviors directly related to 
attack-planning.  
 
Lack of resources limits what terrorists can do (Boyns and Ballard 2004). Many 
studies depict human capital as the key resource (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). 
Jackson (2001) argues that larger terrorist organizations should be better at adopting 
and effectively using new technologies. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) demonstrate that 
larger organizations are typically more lethal. Another possibility to consider is that 
the size of an organizational component will have a differential impact depending on 
the type of attack that is carried out. The level of expertise that a type of attack 
demands should have an impact on how human resources affect the success of that 
kind of attack (Jackson 2009, 12-13). The level of technical expertise needed for a 
standard attack against members of the public for example could be considered low – 
so the impact of having limited technical skills should be minimal. On the other hand, 
complex attacks demand a higher level of organization, expertise, and security (if you 
assume that complex attacks have the potential to be more spectacular in their 
consequences) (Jackson 2009, 12-13).  
 
The more engagement with a wider group, the more likely the individual will have 
acquired the requisite knowledge to conduct an attack on a difficult target. Broader 
radicalized groupings are likely to contain more knowledge, and more knowledge 
may lead to a more sophisticated plot. Thus, group influence and total knowledge 
should be related positively to one another from this perspective.  
 
 7 
Separate from the knowledge argument is one based on experience. This is important 
on two fronts. First, actors may be constrained in terms of their technical attack 
capability. This appears to be a major problem for them. Gill (2015) provides a range 
of case examples illustrating that lone actors tend originally to plot large-scale attacks, 
but end up having to scale these down due to technical constraints or alternatively 
engage in a number of criminal activities in order to obtain the necessary materials. 
Previous experience of criminal activity may aid potential lone-actor terrorists by 
providing the know-how to obtain particular materials. Second, without a group of co-
offenders, an individual may lack the psychological impetus to engage in a violent 
attack. The lone-actor terrorist James Kopp's recollection of his actions illustrates the 
sentiments involved: “To pick up a gun and aim it at another human being, and to fire, 
it's not a human thing to do. It's not nice. It's not pleasant. It's gory, it's bloody. It 
overcomes every human instinct”. Military psychology shows that it is easier to 
develop the psychological capability to kill within a group setting (given the right 
conditions) than it is when going it alone (Grossman, 2005; Gill 2012). Within a cell 
of like-minded individuals, cognitive, evaluative and affective components of the 
group can impact and shape behavior. However, if the individual has a history of 
violence or experience in the military, such hurdles will have previously been 
surmounted, potentially leading to greater capability, potentially allowing an attack on 
a more difficult target. Thus, we expect that having more experience should allow a 
lone-actor to be more ambitious in his/her planning.  
 
 
Gill et al. (2014) illustrated ‘leakage’ (the prior declaration by the actor of his beliefs 
and or intent to commit violence) as a regularly occurring antecedent behavior which 
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is significantly linked to plots being intercepted. Given the difficulty surrounding the 
targeting of high-value targets, we might also expect greater operational security 
within such plots.  
 
The existing literature on lone-actor terrorism characterizes many of the lone-actors as 
evidencing a number of recent stressors and risk factors that crystalize together prior 
to attack-planning. Given that high-value targets necessitate greater planning, we may 
expect that those lone-actors who have recently suffered stressors would also produce 
more spontaneous  and less planned attacks.  
 
From the above discussions, we hypothesize the following:  
H1: Lone-actor terrorists with some form of prior relationship with 
extremist movements are more likely to attack high-value targets. 
H2: Lone-actor terrorist events against high-value targets will 
demonstrate a greater degree of pre-attack planning. 
H3: Lone-actor terrorists with a history of criminality, violence or 
military experience will more likely attack high-value targets. 
H4: Lone-actor terrorists plotting against high-value targets are 
significantly less likely to leak information in the build-up to the plot. 
H5: Lone-actor terrorists who experienced stressors in the previous six 
months were significantly more likely to attack members of the public. 
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Data and Method 
The dataset utilized for the subsequent analyses comprises Gill's (2015) codebook1 
and sample of 111 individuals who engaged in, or planned to engage in, a lone-actor 
terrorist event. All individuals were either citizens of, or carried out an attack in, the 
United States or Europe between 1990 and 2014, and were either convicted for their 
actions or died in the commission of their offence. The principal condition for 
inclusion as a lone-actor is whether the individual carried out or planned the offence 
alone. Individuals may have previously been a member of a group, or even trained 
and equipped by an organization, but their offence was attempted autonomously. The 
second condition for inclusion concerns ideology. To be considered for inclusion, an 
individual must have carried out, or planned to carry out, an attack in the name of 
some form of political ideology.  
 
The codebook was developed based on extensive reviews of the literature and of 
existing codebooks concerning individuals who had committed a wide range of 
violent and non-violent offences, were victimized, and/or had engaged in high-risk 
behaviors. It includes over 185 variables spanning socio-demographic information, 
pre-event behaviors, event-specific behaviors, post-event behaviors and network 
related behaviors. Actor profiles were built using the LexisNexis archive of open 
source information, news and scholarly articles, public record depositories and lone-
actor biographies.  
 
Three independent coders coded each data observation separately. Observations were 
then reconciled using a two-stage process (coder A with B, then coders A and B with 
                                                        
1 For a more in depth explanation of the codebook construction, see Gill (2015, p19-22). 
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C). When coder conclusions remained inconsistent, differences were resolved through 
consultation of the original sources, factoring in decisions regarding the reliability of 
sources, and the sources cited in the reports used. To aid this process, each source was 
plotted on a continuum of reliability (Table 1). Court transcripts and associated 
documents were deemed most reliable, as these documents recorded finalizations of 
judicial decisions. Competency evaluations, sworn affidavits and indictments were 
deemed reliable, as these were carried out post arrest and prior to trial, when initial 
investigations had been made. Statements (verbal or written) by the terrorist/affiliated 
group were deemed somewhat reliable, as there may be manipulated for propaganda 
purposes. Warrants and Expert Witness reports were also reasoned to be somewhat 
reliable, as warrants are produced prior to arrest, and like Expert Witness reports are 
subject to unreliability and bias. Media articles were then placed on a separate 
continuum within the less reliable end of the spectrum; personal opinion blogs were 
placed at the lower end and broadsheet newspapers at the upper end.  
Table 1 Continuum of Reliability for Open-Source Data 
Least 
Reliable 
Partially Reliable Somewhat 
Reliable 
Reliable Very Reliable 
 
Media Articles Manifestos Competency 
Evaluations 
Trial Transcripts 
Internet 
Blogs 
Tabloids Broadsheets Warrants Sworn 
Affidavits 
Trial 
Memorandums 
  Expert Witness 
Reports 
Indictments  
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As target choice was the variable of interest in this investigation, actors who were 
apprehended in the planning phase of their attack, and who had not or did not 
subsequently declare a confirmed target choice, were removed from the analysis. This 
left 102 lone-actors in the study sample. Target choice was coded dichotomously as 
‘high-value’ (HVT) or ‘general public’ using the same coding strategy as Asal et al. 
(2015). High-value targets were defined as government, business, military and 
political entities (including both personnel and buildings), and general public targets 
were defined as targets involving both discriminate and non-discriminate attacks on 
members of the public. Actors who targeted both high-value and general public 
entities were coded as HVT. We developed five aggregated variables related to target 
choice; network capabilities, attack planning, antecedent behaviors and experiences, 
leakage, and recent stressors. 
 
For the aggregated variable ‘network capabilities’, we included: whether the 
individual had; a family member or close friend(s) who was involved in criminality 
(25%), or  a spouse or partner who had engaged with a terrorist movement (5%); 
whether the individual had received hands-on training for the attack (25%), interacted 
face to face with members of a wider terrorist network (41%), interacted virtually 
with members of a wider terrorist network (29%), involved others when procuring 
weaponry for the attack (17%), or involved others in assembling constituents for IED 
related attacks (5%), and whether the individual had command-and-control links with 
a wider organization or network (7%). 
 
For the variable ‘attack planning’ we included; whether the individual had engaged in 
dry runs of their attack (31%), whether the individual had engaged in learning or 
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developed plans for their attack through virtual (i.e. on-line) sources (43%), and 
whether the individual had travelled (either domestically or internationally) to engage 
in preparatory activities (26%). 
 
‘Antecedent behaviors and experiences’ encompassed whether an individual had 
previously  received military training (25%), whether they had any previous criminal 
convictions (51%), and whether they had engaged in any violent behavior prior to 
their attack (45%). 
 
The aggregated variable ‘leakage’ comprised pre-event declarations: whether the 
individual had produced letters or publically available statements (62%), whether the 
individual had declared their intent or beliefs to family or friends (53%), whether the 
individual had declared their intent or beliefs to a wider audience (51%), whether at 
least one other person knew of the individual’s grievance (76%), or of their ideology 
(71%), whether the individual had given a specific pre-attack warning (23%), whether 
at least one other person knew of the individual’s planning (35%), whether the 
individual had expressed a desire to hurt people (69%), and whether the individual 
had sought legitimization for their intended actions (15%).  
 
For the aggregation of ‘recent stressors’, we included situations that had occurred in 
the six months prior to the attack: being made unemployed (8%), dropping out of 
education (3%), experiencing the death of a close family member (1%), work-related 
stressors (2%), being denigrated(5%), being the target of an act of 
prejudice/unfairness (5%), being lied to or disrespected (4%), being ignored or treated 
poorly by someone important to them (5%), feeling that they were not cared about 
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(5%), being the victim of a verbal or physical assault (1%), being a helpless victim 
(4%), having personal relationship (10%) and/or financial (8%) problems, and 
experiencing stress (17%). 
 
Results 
 
An initial comparison of lone-actors who made a definitive target choice found that 
47% chose a HVT, with 53% choosing a general population target.  
 
To compare antecedent and event-related behaviors in lone-actors according to target 
choice, we conducted a bivariate tests using chi-square and Fisher’s exact. Table 2 
sets out the differences between the two groups in the five key aggregate variables of 
interest. 
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Table 2 Bivariate Comparison of Behaviors Related to Target Choice 
Variable 
Percentage Prevalence 
 General 
public 
(n=54) 
HVT 
(n=48) 
Network Behaviors 
72.2% 64.6% 
Planning Behaviors 61.1% 68.8% 
Antecedent Behaviors and Experiences 72.2% 70.8% 
Leakage Behaviors 
96.3%* 83.3% 
Stressors 
27.8% 29.2% 
* = < .05, ** = < 0.01, *** = <.001 
 
Table 3 highlights the differences between the general public and HVT groups in 
terms of a range of characteristics. These are examined separately for each of the 
individual variables included in Table 2. Again chi square, and where appropriate, 
Fisher’s exact Tests were used. Significant results are explained below. 
 
Variable Percentage Prevalence 
 General 
public (n=54) 
HVT 
(n=48) 
Network Behaviors   
Family/Close Friends Involved in Criminality 27.8% 22.9% 
Spouse Involved in a Violent Political Movement 7.4% 2.1% 
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Received Hands on Training 24.1% 25.0% 
Face to Face Interaction with Members of a Network 46.3% 35.4% 
Virtual Interaction with Members of a Network 31.5% 27.1% 
Others Involved in Procurement of Weaponry 14.8% 18.8% 
Others Involved in IED Assembly 5.6% 4.2% 
Evidence of Command and Control Links with a Network 9.3% 4.2% 
Planning Behaviors   
Undertook Dry Runs 33.3% 29.2% 
Online Learning  35.2% 52.1% 
Travelled for Preparatory Activities 29.6% 22.9% 
Antecedent Behaviors and Experiences   
Military Experience 24.1% 25.0% 
Criminal Convictions 48.1% 54.2% 
History of Violence 50.0% 39.6% 
Leakage Behaviors   
Produced Letters  66.7% 56.3% 
Made Statements to Family and/or Friends 55.6% 50.0% 
Made Statements to a Wider Audience 51.9% 50.0% 
Others were Aware of Actor's Grievance 83.3% 68.8% 
Others were Aware of Actor's Ideology 77.8% 62.5% 
Specific Warning of Intent Given 22.2% 22.9% 
Others Aware of Individual's Research/Planning 31.5% 39.6% 
Expressed a Desire to Hurt Others 79.6%* 56.3% 
Sought Legitimization for Grievance/Intentions 18.5% 10.4% 
Stressors    
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Made Unemployed 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 11.1% 4.2% 
Familial Death 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 1.9% 0.0% 
Drop Out of Education 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 3.7% 2.1% 
Work Related Stressor 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 1.9% 2.1% 
Experienced being Degraded 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 3.7% 6.3% 
Experienced being a Target of Prejudice 6 Months Prior to 
Arrest/Event 
3.7% 6.3% 
Experienced being Disrespected 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 3.7% 4.2% 
Felt Ignored 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 3.7% 6.3% 
Felt as No One Cared 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 5.6% 4.2% 
Experienced being a Victim 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 1.9% 0.0% 
Experienced being a Helpless Victim 6 Months Prior to 
Arrest/Event 
3.7% 4.2% 
Problems with Personal Relationships 6 Months Prior to 
Arrest/Event 
13.0% 6.3% 
Experienced Financial Problems 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 7.4% 8.3% 
Experienced Stress 6 Months Prior to Arrest/Event 16.7% 16.7% 
* = < .05, ** = < 0.01, *** = <.001 
The paucity of significant results highlights the limited differences between the two 
groups of lone-actors. Those who targeted the general public were significantly more 
likely to express a desire to hurt others. Individuals who targeted the general public 
showed a stronger, though non-significant pattern of leakage-related behaviors, with a 
higher prevalence of all relevant factors other than making others aware of their 
research and/or planning for their attack. Very few actors experienced stressful life 
events in the six months prior to their arrest/attack. The pattern of results indicates 
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there to be little difference in the experience of stress between the actor types, with 
the same proportion reporting stress in each group (16.7%). A greater proportion of 
who chose high-value targets learnt or prepared for their attack using the Internet 
(52.1% v. 35.2%). Greater proportions of  who chose general public targets made 
others aware of their grievance (83.3% v. 68.8%)  or ideology (77.8% v. 62.5%), 
travelled for preparatory activities (29.6% v. 22.9%), and conduct dry runs (33.3% v. 
29.2%). However, these differences did not reach statistical significance.  
 
Discussion 
The results indicate that very little distinguishes those who plan to target the general 
public and those who plot against high-value targets. In only one of the five 
aggregated variables (leakage behaviours) was a significant difference found. 
Specifically, those who targeted members of the public were significantly more likely 
to leak aspects of their plot or information regarding their extremist beliefs. This 
offers support for hypothesis 4 (above). This has some implications for threat 
management and intelligence analysis. The leakage of intent is regularly used as a key 
warning indicator (Meloy and Gill, 2016): but the results here suggest it is more likely 
to lead to detection in cases where the general public are targeted. Nevertheless, at 
83%, leakage is still a common occurrence in high-value target plots. Other studies 
utilizing the same dataset have analysed the cases according to ideological boundaries 
(Gill, 2015) and the presence of mental health problems (Corner and Gill, 2015): 
issues to do with leakage appeared with the same prevalence across all of these 
subsets.  
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The question then remains, how do intelligence and policing agencies encourage the 
recipients of leakage to come forward with this information. This is not an easy task. 
As Williams and Horgan’s (2016) survey research shows, peers are unlikely to come 
forward, fearing they would get their friend in trouble. In some cases, there may be a 
complete disconnect between policing agencies and the communities within which 
there is a radicalisation problem. This is evidenced in the continuing attacks in France 
and Belgium through 2014 to date. There is no easy solution but to help build 
resilience in these communities around radicalisation awareness coupled with deep 
and continuing partnerships with front-line services (e.g. mental health, probation, 
education) which may spend a lot of face-time with potentially radicalised individuals 
and/or be the recipients of such leakage.  
 
Surprisingly, target choice, in aggregate terms, had next to nothing to do with issues 
around capabilities and degree of planning. This confounds expectations derived from 
criminologically-oriented rational choice paradigms. Future research may shed light 
on their decision-making process in the form of cases studies examining actors who 
attacked high-value targets. For now though, we can use a series of illustrations to try 
understand how that particular target was chosen.  
 
In May 2010, Roshonora Choudhry stabbed Labour Party MP Stephen Timms on 
behalf of the al-Qaeda movement. In her interview with police on the day of the 
attack, Choudhry was asked how she felt about what she had done that day. She 
replied; “I feel like I did what I’d planned to do…I feel like I’ve ruined the rest of my 
life. I feel like it’s worth it because millions of Iraqis are suffering and I should do 
what I can to help them and not just be inactive and do nothing while they suffer”. 
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Because of the attack, Choudhry felt that she had “fulfilled my obligation, my Islamic 
duty to stand up for the people of Iraq and to punish someone who wanted to make 
war with them”. As part of her preparations, Choudhry devised a list of Members of 
Parliament who voted for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. She researched the backgrounds 
of London-based Members of Parliament using the website ‘They Work For You’ 
which includes information on voting records. She apparently concentrated her 
research on Labour ministers Jim Fitzpatrick, Margaret Hodge, Nick Raynsford and 
Stephen Timms. Detectives later declared Timms her “sole and easiest target”. This 
decision to attack Timms was made three to four weeks prior to the attack itself. 
Timms was Choudhry’s local Member of Parliament. Her online research showed that 
Timms regularly voted with his government. She later told detectives that “he just 
voted strongly for everything, as though he had no mercy. As though he felt no doubts 
that what he was doing was right even though it was such an arrogant thing to do and 
I just felt like if he could treat the Iraqi people so mercilessly, then why should I show 
him any mercy?”  
 
What is interesting about this case is that there is a mixture of religious/political and 
personal reasons behind the targeting of Timms. Choudhry had previously met Timms 
twice. The first occasion occurred three years prior to the attack on a trip organized by 
her secondary school when she was 17. On the second occasion, Choudhry met 
Timms at his offices and sought a grant to continue her £3290 a year English degree 
at King’s College London. She felt entitled to this grant because her father was 
unemployed and her family were relying on social welfare. Timms rejected her 
request and according to Newham Councillor Lucky Mish, Choudhry got “very 
angry”. Soon after this rejection, she withdrew from University and filled her day by 
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spending time online looking at radicalizing material. In terms of target choice and 
decision-making, we can make three conclusions. First, Choudhry also had a personal 
grievance against the target, one that predated any radicalization and attack planning. 
Second, she had awareness of the attack location from one of her previous meetings 
with Timms. Third, Timms’ office was not as target hardened as the above theorizing 
assumes and very low-key attack planning and preparation was necessary to obtain 
access and carry out the attack.  
 
Whilst Timms was a high-value target, his job as a member of parliament and his 
constituency work provided an opportunity for a very unsophisticated attack to 
succeed. The same is true for several other attacks on high-value targets such as 
Walter Leroy Moody’s letter bombing campaign of various members and institutions 
of the U.S. judicial system and Miles Cooper’s similar campaign against state 
institutions that Cooper associated with the rise of the surveillance state. The ease of 
access in the Timms case is also reminiscent of the murder of Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn who was shot six times in public following a radio interview.  
 
In June 2009 Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (formerly Carlos Bledsoe) conducted 
a drive-by shooting on soldiers outside of a U.S. military recruitment office in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, killing one and injuring one. In September 2007, he left the U.S. for 
Yemen ostensibly to learn Arabic. During this time, he apparently radicalized further. 
He desired entry into Somalia to obtain militant training. Before he could leave, 
Yemeni authorities arrested him in October 2008. He returned to the U.S and to his 
hometown of Little Rock in January 2009. Upon his return to the U.S., Muhammad 
began planning an attack. He researched potential targets online including military 
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facilities, Jewish centers, a post office, a Baptist church and a childcare center. These 
targets were geographically spread and included Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, 
Florence, Kentucky, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington D.C. He claims the 
eventual attack “wasn’t part of Plan A. Plan A was aborted because of failed attacks 
in Tennessee and Kentucky”. In Nashville Tennessee, his attempt to firebomb a 
Rabbi’s house failed when the Molotov Cocktail bounced harmlessly off the window 
rather than smashing through it. In Florence, Kentucky a drive-by shooting at an 
Army recruitment center was called off when he realized it was closed as he arrived.  
 
So, the eventual attack at “the Crusader Center in Little Rock was Plan B. And 
compared to what I had planned originally, it was like a grain of sand. One crusader 
dead, one wounded, 15 terrorized, big deal. Nidal Malik is the real Islamic Warrior, 
and my plan A was on that scale. It included Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, 
Florence KY, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and was supposed to end in DC.” He also 
lamented his failure to obtain bomb-making training in Yemen or Somalia. “I wanted 
training in explosives, on how to make bombs and in particular, car bombs, and had I 
got this training my story would have ended a lot differently than it’s going to end 
now. My drive-by would have been a drive-in, with none escaping the aftermath”. 
This case highlights that the lack of human capital does not necessarily deter the 
would-be offender from his eventual target, but rather makes him opt for a practicable 
attack method. Rather than displacing his activities toward a much easier target, a 
search process was undertaken that sought the key vulnerabilities  of a high-value 
target.  
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Other lone-actors benefitted from the lack of situational crime prevention measures in 
place at the time their attack occurred. The theory outlined above presumes that such 
measures are routine but this was not always the case, particularly the offenders that 
emerged through the 1990’s. In April 1995, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Heavily influenced by the attack on the J. 
Edgar Hoover FBI building in The Turner Diaries, McVeigh decided to bomb a 
government building. Unlike Turner’s location in Washington DC, McVeigh wanted 
to hit the heartland of America. His initial list included possible targets in Arkansas, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Texas. Ultimately, he chose the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City because he understood that it held offices for the 
ATF, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Secret Service, thereby providing 
maximum federal government causalities. Additionally he believed the U-shaped 
glass building would be easily damaged with a bomb placed inside the “U.” Three 
days prior to the attack, McVeigh parked the getaway car in an alley very close to the 
Murrah Building and placed a sign that said, “Not abandoned. Please do not tow. Will 
move by April 23 (needs battery and cable).” Current situational security measures 
would undoubtedly have marked this vehicle as suspicious and security procedures 
would have increased in the days afterwards and potentially stopped McVeigh from 
parking the bomb-laden truck at the empty front parking area of the Murrah building. 
Again, current target hardening measures like moving parking lots away from 
buildings and installing barriers to prevent vehicles getting close may have made this 
target unsuitable in McVeigh’s prior cost-benefit analysis and displaced him 
elsewhere. In a similar vein, Anders Breivik was said to have expedited his attack on 
the government building upon hearing that new target-hardening security and parking 
procedures were about to be enacted at the site  (Hemmingby & Bjorgo, 2015). 
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Some lone-actors did not necessitate the hypothesized factors because their routine 
activities gave them access to the targets they needed. This includes Arid Uka an 
employee at Frankfurt Airport who had (a) regular contact with U.S. Military passing 
through the Airport and (b) access to a firearm which he passed through the less 
rigorous security screening given to employees compared to that of civilian 
passengers. It also includes Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, who had 
easy access to firearms and suitable targets via his day job at Fort Hood, Texas. 
Similarly, Sgt. Asan Akbar of the U.S. Army threw grenades at fellow soldiers at a 
military command center in Kuwait. Bruce Ivins managed to send anthrax spores via 
the mail system to several high value targets. His job allowed him access to these 
materials, thus negating much of the social capital theorized as necessary earlier. 
These cases potentially present the need for screening processes of employees at 
locations where high-value targets are likely to frequent regularly.  
Conclusion 
Whilst studies of large datasets on lone-actor terrorists and on low-likelihood events 
shed light on patterns, processes and sub-unit differences, case study analyses may 
shed more light on the intricate decisions and trajectories that led individuals to 
commit acts of grievance-fuelled violence (be it personal, political, religious or all of 
the above). Our large dataset analysis largely confounded expectations. Whilst theory 
suggests that attacks on high-value targets would involve greater human capital, 
technical experience and planning, the findings suggest these traits are just as likely to 
be found in those attacking softer targets.  
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Our large dataset analysis allows us to determine that, among lone-actors, the decision 
to target a particular target (e.g. general public vs. high-value targets) occurs very 
early in the decision-making process, usually following grievance formation and 
establishment. From there, opportunities in terms of specific target and attack method 
are sought from a variety of sources, with large proportions of actors sourcing support 
(both sociological and logistical) from others. The results highlight the necessity to 
focus preventive efforts on pre-attack leakage and the network-related behaviors of 
lone-actors As this study has shown, whether a lone-actor successfully executes their 
initial attack plan against their desired target  appears to be dependent upon their 
individual willingness to adapt their available abilities to their surroundings, 
opportunity and easy access to the chosen target and, to some extent, on pure luck in 
security agencies not interdicting their plots.  
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